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Abstract 
 Sociological research has studied the implementation and effects of transitional justice 
mechanisms on societies recovering from mass atrocities like genocide, but little is known about 
the attitudes of victims before the transitional justice mechanisms are implemented. This article 
analyzes over 1,500 interviews from Darfuri genocide victims living in refugee camps in eastern 
Chad to assess the relationship between their exposure to violence and their punitive attitudes 
towards perpetrators. I find that respondents with both familial and/or personal exposures to 
violence have higher odds of favoring the death penalty for Sudanese government officials and 
army commanders but that they have lower odds of choosing the same fate for Sudanese 
government soldiers. The respondents’ age, gender, voting history, knowledge of international 
response to the conflict, and personal opinions on the possibility of living peacefully with former 
enemies are also consequential. I conclude by discussing the role personal connections and 
military conscription could play in the relationship as well as the overall importance of 
incorporating victims’ attitudes into post-conflict transitional justice decisions. 
 
Introduction 
 In what the United Nations has called the world’s worst humanitarian crisis (UN 2004), 
hundreds of thousands of Darfuri people have been killed and millions more have been displaced 
by the genocide in Darfur, Sudan. Although international organizations like the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) have struggled to intervene in the region, the perpetrators of the genocide 
are still in power and the violence has not ended. How do familial and person victimization 
during the Darfuri genocide influence punitive attitudes towards perpetrators of these crimes? 
This article attempts to answer this question by analyzing whether and how these exposures to 
violence are associated with punitive attitudes of Darfuri genocide victims. Though much is 
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known about the punitive and restorative responses to mass atrocity, little is known about 
victims’ attitudes regarding punishing perpetrators, particularly while the conflict is still ongoing 
like the Darfuri genocide.  
Following a brief discussion of the history of Darfur, I summarize literature on why and 
how a nation reconciles mass atrocities by implementing transitional justice mechanisms. I then 
discuss the limited existing literature on punitive attitudes in the context of genocide. Next, I turn 
to a discussion of the methods and analysis where I explain the logistic regression model I use to 
quantitatively analyze interview data from 1,576 Darfuri refugees living in camps in eastern 
Chad. Findings reveal that respondents with personal exposure to violence have higher odds of 
preferring the death penalty for leaders responsible for mobilizing crime—government officials 
and army commanders—but have lower odds of preferring the death penalty for the actual 
perpetrators of the crime—the soldiers. Respondents with familial exposure to violence also have 
higher odds of preferring the death penalty for government officials and army commanders, 
though there is no significant relationship between familial exposure to violence and punitive 
attitudes towards government soldiers. The article closes by discussing two potential 
explanations for the respondents’ lower punitive attitudes towards soldiers: first, soldiers may 
have been from the same community as victims creating personal connections between them and 
their victims and, second, Sudanese mandatory military conscription requirements may allow 
victims to place blame on the officials giving orders, not the soldiers.  
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Darfur: A Historical Background 
 In February 2003, two rebel groups known as the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) launched an attack against the Sudanese government, 
accusing the government of neglecting non-Arab peoples in Darfur, the western region of Sudan. 
The Sudanese government responded to the rebel attacks with a complete offensive against 
Darfur, specifically targeting “African”1 tribes like the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa groups. The 
Sudanese government armed and trained a mostly Arab militia known as the Janjaweed who 
work in conjunction with Sudanese government soldiers to attack villages with aerial and ground 
bombardments, resulting in widespread death and mutilation of the Darfuri people (Bassil 2004). 
In contrast to the tribal Janjaweed militia, the Sudanese government soldiers involved in the 
attacks are typically a part of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the national armed forces of 
Sudan which employs mandatory military conscription
2
. 
Though the government officials and army commanders play a role in organizing and 
mobilizing the violence, the Janjaweed and government soldiers are the actual perpetrators
3
 of 
the violence against the Darfuri people (Flint 2009). deWaal (2007) notes that the Sudanese 
government soldiers supplement attacks by the Janjaweed, who were given permission by the 
Sudanese government to pursue their own territorial expansion agendas if they suppress the 
rebellion. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) estimate that between 300,000 and 400,000 
people were killed and two to three million people were displaced in the first few years of the 
                                                          
1
 The term “African” is written in quotation marks because, in Sudan, it is a socially constructed division most often 
juxtaposed against “Arab.” President Omar al-Bashir consolidated and otherized the ethnic groups when he 
derogatorily called them “Zourga” and demanded to end their history (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008). For 
more information on Sudanese and Darfuri identity formation, reference: de Waal, Alex. 2005. “Who are the 
Darfurians? Arab and African identities, violence and external engagement.” African Affairs. 104 (415): 181-205. 
2
 The SAF does use mandatory military conscription, though there is disagreement about the age of conscription 
(Copley 2006). 
3
 The phrase “actual perpetrators” refers to the people carrying out the violence on the ground as opposed to leaders 
who plan the violence or arm the soldiers. 
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conflict. Accurate numbers of the genocide’s devastation are difficult to estimate (Hagan & 
Palloni 2006) and the death toll is expected to be even higher now that eight years has passed 
since these estimates. In addition to extensive death and displacement, sexual victimization is a 
marked issue in the region. While men do experience sexual violence, a disproportionate amount 
of women are abducted, raped, mutilated, and returned to their villages by the soldiers, forcing 
the women to live with the stigma and dishonor of their sexual violation (Hagan and Rymond-
Richmond 2008). Today, Darfur remains a dangerous warzone plagued with both Arab and non-
Arab people being exposed to high amounts of violence. 
 Despite the severity of the violence in Darfur, this conflict is not the first wide-scale 
atrocity committed within Sudan’s borders. Darfur was an independent sultanate until 1916 when 
it became a neglected colony of Britain (deWaal 2007). Darfur saw no large societal advances 
through the late 1950s because of British inattention, making the people impoverished and the 
region underserviced. Over the course of multiple generations after the fall of the sultanate, the 
Darfuri people attempted to assimilate into Sudanese culture in an attempt to be seen as 
legitimate citizens by dominant traders and officials. When the Darfuri people demanded greater 
attention from the Sudanese government in the 1980s and 1990s, their requests went 
unanswered, sparking smaller conflicts in the region (Flint & deWaal 2008). Simultaneously, 
civil wars raged outside of Darfur in greater Sudan and Chad, resulting in further marginalization 
of the non-Arab populations within those territories (deWaal 2007).  
The longstanding conflict between Arab and non-Arab populations in the region 
compounded with other genocidal factors such as arming of the Janjaweed, racial targeting, 
direct government involvement in the violence, and sexual violence; the presence of the 
aforementioned factors qualifies the violence in Darfur as a genocide according to Article II of 
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the Genocide Convention (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008)
4
. Savelsberg (2015) emphasizes 
that classifying the mass atrocity in Darfur as genocide is monumentally important, as it 
criminalizes the violence and dictates the ways international bodies like the International 
Criminal Court responds. In fact, the ICC opened an investigation which resulted in the 
indictment of three Sudanese government officials
5
, including the sitting president of Sudan, 
Omar al-Bashir. Al-Bashir—charged with multiple counts of crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and genocide—is the first sitting head of state indicted by the ICC. In late 2014, Chief 
Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda (2014) decided to table the investigation, citing the United Nations 
Security Council’s inaction and the ICC’s limited resources as causes for tabling all active 
investigations. The ICC’s inaction has allowed President Omar al-Bashir’s regime to continue 
the violence, marking thirteen years of destruction to the Darfuri people. 
 
Justice, Punitive Attitudes, and Prosecuting State Actors 
 The pursuit of justice is fundamental to social life (Rawls 1971) and it is particularly 
important to consider justice when addressing human rights abuses after periods of mass 
atrocities. The processes that societies use to redress previous human rights violations during 
particularly violent historical periods are increasingly classified as “transitional justice” (Arthur 
2009; Boraine et al. 1994). Transitional justice is implemented through different mechanisms 
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 There is no universally agreed upon standard definition for genocide. Some scholars believe the Genocide 
Convention’s definition is flawed and, as a result, prefer definitions that include other factors not listed here, like 
violence against a political group. Others argue that the conflict in Darfur qualified as genocide at one point in time, 
but does not meet the definition currently. Based on the studies listed in the background section, this study considers 
the conflict in Darfur to be genocide. 
5
 The three Sudanese government officials indicted by the ICC were Omar al-Bashir (President of Sudan), Ahmed 
Mohammed Haroun (current Governor of South Kordofan and former Sudanese Minister of State for Humanitarian 
Affairs), and Abdel Rahim Mohammed Hussein (current Governor of Khartoum State and former Minister of 
Interior of Affairs). Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, a senior commander of the Janjaweed known as “colonel 
of colonels” and three rebel force leaders—Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Saleh Jerbo, and Abdallah Banda—were also 
indicted by the ICC. 
6 
 
such as prosecuting perpetrators, providing reparations to victims, creating truth commissions, 
and memorializing victims in order to respond to a group’s violent past (Fischer 2011; ICTJ 
2015).  
 The transitional justice mechanism of holding political actors legally accountable for 
their actions marks a rapid shift that Kathryn Sikkink (2013) has termed the “justice cascade.” 
The justice cascade is the process of prosecuting political leaders who were previously immune 
to punishment for human rights abuses. The conflict in Darfur exemplifies the advances 
associated with the justice cascade, as multiple key government officials—including sitting 
president Omar al-Bashir—have already been indicted by the ICC for their involvement in the 
atrocities (Savelsberg 2015).  
 Despite the growing potential to hold political actors criminally liable for their actions, 
some question whether it is preferable to prosecute and punish perpetrators or forgive and forget 
past crimes in times of transition (Minow 2002; Menkel-Meadow 2007). While successors of 
violent regimes may feel obligated to hold criminals accountable for their actions, create a new 
rule of law, and attempt to deter future crimes, some argue it is also necessary for both state 
actors and victims to compromise and forgive past abuses in order to move forward (Roht-
Arriaza 1995). Inherent in this dilemma is the distinction between restorative and retributive 
justice. Restorative justice centers on the victim, emphasizing the repair of social relations with 
an eye toward the future; retributive justice, conversely, focuses on punishing the perpetrator 
with an eye toward past crimes (Braithwaite 2002).
6
 Though many studies exist regarding how 
both restorative and retributive transitional justice mechanisms are implemented and the effects 
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 There was previously much debate about which form of justice—restorative or retributive—was better suited for 
transitional justice. Presently, however, transitional justice scholars have increasingly come to a consensus that 
restorative and retributive mechanisms should be used in conjunction to most effectively achieve the goals of 
transitional justice. 
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(Kim & Sikkink 2010; Olsen et al. 2010), there is little evidence on the victims’ preferences 
between restorative or retributive transitional justice mechanisms (van de Merwe 2009). Bratton 
(2011) analyzed victims’ punitive attitudes in the context of the violent political campaigns in 
Zimbabwe and found that victims of political violence are more likely to want legal redress in 
the transitional political structure. These findings indicate victims’ clear retributive justice 
preference after violent conflicts which suggest that victims in a violent conflict like the one in 
Darfur may experience the same retributive justice preference.  
 There is limited existing literature on punitive attitudes in non-Western societies and a 
particular gap in literature about punitive attitudes while conflicts are still ongoing. Existing 
studies conducted in Western societies like the United States, however, reveal that the strongest 
indicators for punitive attitudes are race, education, income, fear of crime, and marital status 
(Dowler 2003). Although research does indicate that different demographics of a society can 
influence punitive attitudes, there is by no means a consensus on which demographic information 
has the greatest effect on punitive attitudes (Cohn et al. 1991). There is, nevertheless, a general 
agreement that there is a link between the perceived seriousness of a crime and punitive attitude 
(Blumstein & Cohen 1980; Hamilton & Rytina 1980). Those crimes seen as incredibly violent 
(like murder and rape) are often correlated with higher punitive attitudes whereas less violent 
crimes (like theft and vandalism) are associated with lower punitive attitudes.  The majority of 
crimes committed during the Darfuri conflict are the aforementioned violent offenses that are 
traditionally associated with higher punitive attitudes. I expect that people with an exposure to 
these violent offenses in the Darfuri conflict will have higher punitive attitudes. 
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Methodology 
 To assess the relationship between exposure to violence and thoughts on reconciliation, I 
examine data collected by 24 Hours for Darfur, a nonprofit organization working to end the 
conflict in Darfur. For this study, I use 1,576 interviews conducted in twelve eastern Chad 
refugee camps between April and July of 2009. Refugees over the age of eighteen were chosen 
for the interviews using a stratified sample approach. As such, the data are representative of the 
adult Darfuri population across the twelve refugee camps studied. The stratified random 
sampling method used geographic location (camp and block) and gender as strata. The first 
stratum was location, with the number of interviews from a given block in a given camp set to be 
proportional to the population of the block. An equal number of men and women were sampled 
in each block, constituting an oversampling of men as there are fewer men in the camps than 
women. 24 Hours for Darfur has worked to ensure that the statistics accurately reflect the 
population of the eastern Chad camps by weighting different groups. Oversampled groups (like 
men) were given a weight less than 1 while groups that were not oversampled (like women) were 
given a weight greater than 1
7
.  
Respondents voluntarily answered questions in one-on-one interviews conducted in their 
place of residence using either Arabic or a local language. The research team conducting the 
interviews consisted of 27 people, most of whom had worked or lived in Sudan or Chad and had 
extensive experience in refugee camp environments
8
. The majority of interviewers spoke a 
combination of Darfurian Arabic, Fur, Zaghawa, or Massalit. Every team member was required 
to complete a 10 day training session on survey methodology and administration.  
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 Although preliminary analysis does not suggest that the weights will influence the findings, I intend to account for 
the weights in subsequent analysis. 
8
 18 the 27 members of the research team were Darfurian expatriates living in the United States, United Kingdom, or 
Chad. 
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The questionnaire used in the interviews was created over an 18 month period in 
consultation with both academic experts and members of the Darfuri diaspora. The questionnaire 
was originally produced in English and translated to Sudanese Arabic by two separate 
translators. These two versions were then compared and merged into one Sudanese Arabic 
translation. After the initial translation, the merged Sudanese Arabic version was back-translated 
into English by two additional translators. All four translators met to discuss all four versions of 
the survey and produced a final translated version of both the English and Sudanese Arabic 
questionnaire. This final version was translated into Fur, Zaghawa, and Massalit
9
. Once 
translated, preliminary versions of the questionnaire were piloted in Brooklyn, NY, Chad, and 
the United Kingdom between April 2008 and March 2009. The finalized surveys conducted for 
this study had approximately 75 questions and took approximately one hour for interviewers to 
conduct. At the beginning of each interview, interviewers expressed that the goal of the study 
was to gauge their beliefs on the necessary conditions for a just peace in Darfur. The respondents 
were asked about their demographic information and thoughts on peace, justice, and 
reconciliation. For example, respondents were asked what they knew of the ICC, if they believed 
they could live peacefully with their former enemies, and if they had ever previously voted in a 
Sudanese government election. 
 The data are limited to the adult Darfuri population living in the camps surveyed, so the 
data is not representative of the entire population of Darfur or even all persons victimized in the 
Darfuri genocide. The data is only able to capture the opinions of those persons who survived the 
genocide, meaning the views of those who experienced the greatest atrocity in the genocide—
murder—are unable to be represented. Additionally, the views of the survivors living in the 
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 Fur, Zaghawa, and Massalit are traditionally non-written languages, so these translations were produced using a 
phonetic Arabic translation. 
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externally displaced refugee camps
10
 represented here may differ from the large population of 
Darfuri refugees unable to make it to the external camps. Since the surveys were conducted six 
years ago, the attitudes represented by the data are only indicative of the respondents’ attitudes at 
that time. The duration of time spent in the camps and lack of resolution in the genocide may 
alter respondents’ answers if they were surveyed again today or post-conflict. The surveys were 
conducted a couple months after the ICC issued their first warrant of arrest for Sudanese 
President Omar al-Bashir for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. As such, the 
temporal proximity to ICC indictments of key government leaders could have influenced the 
responses. Since over 7 years have passed since the initial indictment of al-Bashir with no 
resolution to the conflict, present attitudes could differ significantly from those recorded by the 
survey in 2009. Finally, the data are limited by the scope of the questions asked and answers 
given. Due to the sensitive nature of the questions on genocide, violence, and injuries, the data 
are restricted by the information offered by respondents.  
Dependent Variables 
 To gauge punitive attitudes, respondents were asked if they believe former combatants 
responsible for violence should be punished, pay a fine, publicly apologize, or be granted 
amnesty.
11
 An overwhelming majority of respondents noted that they would only agree to the 
perpetrators being punished. Respondents were then asked what punishments they felt should be 
given to each actor involved in the violence: Sudanese government officials, Sudanese army 
                                                          
10
 Refugee camps, or externally displaced camps, are those shelters outside of Darfur’s borders. These are contrasted 
with internally displaced camps, the camps set up within Darfur’s borders, for people unable to leave Darfur’s 
borders. The experiences of people living in internally displaced camps differs from the experiences in refugee 
camps, so this study only reflects the population living in external refugee camps in eastern Chad.  
11
 For more information on the specific wording of each question referenced in the paper and potential answers 
respondents could choose, reference Appendix I. 
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commanders, and Sudanese government soldiers
12
. More than sixty percent of respondents chose 
the death penalty for each group over a prison sentence or a fine. As a result, this study uses the 
respondents’ desire for the death penalty for the Sudanese government, army commanders, and 
soldiers as the three measures for punitive attitudes. It is important to disaggregate each actor as 
opposed to merging all Sudanese government actors into one variable because each actor plays a 
different role in the genocide and has different contact with victims. Government officials are 
responsible for perpetuating the image of non-Arab peoples as an outgroup and arming the 
Janjaweed and government soldiers and the army commanders are responsible for organizing the 
military action. The soldiers, on the other hand, are the only actors who typically come into 
direct contact with the victims as they are the people committing the violence.  
Independent Variable 
 The respondent’s exposure to violence is measured in two ways: personal and familial. 
Descriptive statistics of both personal and familial exposure to violence can be found in Table 1 
and Table 2, respectively
13
. Personal exposure is gauged by whether or not the respondent was 
personally maimed in the conflict. Familial exposure is measured by whether or not any of their 
family members—specifically parents, siblings, spouses, children—have been killed in the 
genocide. As these experiences of violence are sensitive topics for victims of mass atrocities, the 
interviewers did not ask for specific details on what “maimed” meant for each respondent, how 
the family members died, or which family members died. For the purposes of this study, 
“maimed” signifies that the respondent was personally injured in some way as a direct result of 
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 Respondents were also asked about appropriate punishments for the Janjaweed commanders, Janjaweed soldiers, 
Darfurian rebel commanders, Darfurian rebel soldiers, and bandits. These variables were not included in this study. 
13
 These tables have different n than those used in the regression. The n used in the regression is lower than the n 
listed in Table 1 and 2 because fewer respondents answered all questions used for the study’s dependent, 
independent, and control variables.  
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the conflict in Darfur.
14
 The independent variables can only gauge whether the respondent was 
injured and whether a family member was killed in the genocide, not the extent of the injury or 
magnitude of the incidents represented. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Personal Exposure to Violence 
 Number Percentage 
Have Been Personally Maimed 643 34.93% 
Have Not Been Personally Maimed 1,198 65.07% 
Total 1,841 100% 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Familial Exposure to Violence 
 Number Percentage 
Family Has Been Killed 1,312 76.86% 
Family Has Not Been Killed 395 23.14% 
Total 1,707 100% 
 
Control Variables 
 The study’s control variables include demographic information like the respondent’s 
age
15
, sex, education, whether they have children, and their marital status as Dowler (2003) 
found that these demographics influence punitive attitudes. I also control for whether the 
respondent previously voted in an election since some of the perpetrators are government 
officials who were elected to their positions and the respondents’ perceptions of political 
legitimacy could affect their punitive attitudes towards these officials. Additionally, I control for 
whether respondents believe they can live peacefully with their former enemies and if they 
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 In the conflict, there are differences in gender-based violence but this measure does not capture the form of 
violence. It is only capturing a general personal exposure to violence. 
15
 I assessed whether the effect of age is quadratic, though the effect is linear. 
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believe that reconciliation is possible between Darfuri tribes because those who do not believe 
either are possible may have higher punitive attitudes to ensure they do not have to live with 
their former enemies once more or reconcile with other tribes. I control for the knowledge of the 
ICC
 
and its functions as familiarity with international bodies that can prosecute perpetrators may 
lead to higher punitive attitudes. Finally, I control for whether the respondents would be satisfied 
if only the leaders were punished for crimes, meaning the actual perpetrators of the crimes would 
go unpunished
16
. Respondents who said that they would not be satisfied with only the leaders 
being punished may be at higher odds to prefer punitive punishments for all actors in the 
violence, not just the leaders. 
Analysis 
 The three dependent variables (supporting the death penalty for Sudanese government 
officials, Sudanese army commanders, and Sudanese government soldiers) are binary variables 
coded as 1 if the respondent supports the death penalty for each respective actor and 0 otherwise. 
Ordinary least squares regression is consequently not appropriate and I instead employ logistic 
regression. Logistic regression measures the relationship between the dependent variable and 
independent variables by estimating probabilities using a logistic function. In the forthcoming 
analysis, I present results using odds ratios to increase readability. This involves exponentiating 
the logistic regression coefficients. Thus, coefficients larger than one are associated with 
increased odds of supporting the death penalty, while coefficients smaller than one are associated 
with decreased odds of supporting the death penalty. 
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 Specifically, respondents were asked if they would be very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat unsatisfied, or 
very unsatisfied “If people who personally committed crimes against you or your community were not punished in a 
criminal justice system, but their bosses were.” 
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Results 
 Table 1 includes the results of the logistic regression of personal exposure to violence 
and support of the death penalty. Table 2 includes the results of the logistic regression of familial 
exposure to violence and support of the death penalty. For both tables, Model 1 examines 
support for the death penalty for Sudanese government officials, Model 2 examines support for 
the death penalty for Sudanese army commanders, and Model 3 examines support for the death 
penalty for Sudanese government soldiers.  
Turning first to Table 1, Models 1 and 2 indicate that people who have been personally 
maimed in the conflict have significantly higher odds of preferring the death penalty for 
Sudanese government officials and Sudanese army commanders. However, someone who was 
personally maimed has significantly lower odds of preferring the death penalty for Sudanese 
government soldiers (Model 3). In other words, people who have been personally injured in the 
conflict have less punitive attitudes for the actual perpetrators of the violence and more punitive 
attitudes for those organizing the violence. Results in Table 2 tell a similar story as the one told 
by Table 1. Models 1 and 2 indicate that people whose family members have been killed in the 
conflict have significantly higher odds of preferring the death penalty for Sudanese government 
officials and Sudanese army commanders. Each table of results reveals that a higher exposure to 
violence increases the punitive attitudes towards the organizers of the violence. Unlike Table 1, 
though, there is no significant relationship between familial exposure to violence and support for 
the death penalty for government soldiers.  
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Table 3: Logistic Regression of Personal Exposure to Violence & Support of Death Penalty (Odds Ratios) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
VARIABLES Government Officials Army Commanders Government Soldiers
Personally Maimed 1.378** 1.304** 0.807*
(1.040 - 1.824) (1.010 - 1.684) (0.641 - 1.017)
Age 0.989** 0.990** 0.996
(0.980 - 0.999) (0.981 - 0.999) (0.987 - 1.004)
Female 2.205*** 1.674*** 2.031***
(1.599 - 3.041) (1.253 - 2.236) (1.566 - 2.635)
Attended School 1.215 0.890 0.655***
(0.891 - 1.658) (0.665 - 1.189) (0.504 - 0.851)
Married 0.919 0.986 1.039
(0.496 - 1.705) (0.556 - 1.747) (0.613 - 1.761)
Have Children 1.576 1.362 1.068
(0.881 - 2.820) (0.792 - 2.341) (0.644 - 1.771)
Previously Voted in Sudanese Election 0.726** 0.726** 0.819
(0.549 - 0.960) (0.560 - 0.940) (0.642 - 1.044)
Believes Reconciliation is Possible between Darfuri Tribes 0.514*** 0.609*** 0.718**
(0.353 - 0.750) (0.436 - 0.849) (0.541 - 0.951)
Heard of ICC, Does Not Know Much About Roles 1.574** 1.476** 1.296
(1.081 - 2.292) (1.037 - 2.101) (0.936 - 1.796)
Heard of ICC, Knows About Roles 2.041*** 1.323 1.324
(1.238 - 3.366) (0.841 - 2.081) (0.864 - 2.029)
Somewhat Possible to Live Peacefully with Former Enemies 1.024 0.909 0.914
(0.673 - 1.559) (0.625 - 1.322) (0.626 - 1.334)
Somewhat Impossible to Live Peacefully with Former Enemies 1.217 1.435 1.590*
(0.656 - 2.258) (0.818 - 2.519) (0.948 - 2.668)
Strongly Impossible to Live Peacefully with Former Enemies 1.598*** 2.285*** 2.730***
(1.182 - 2.161) (1.730 - 3.019) (2.114 - 3.527)
Somewhat Satisfied If Only Leaders Were Punished 1.006 0.835 0.299***
(0.560 - 1.806) (0.484 - 1.442) (0.167 - 0.536)
Somewhat Unsatisfied If Only Leaders Were Punished 1.370 0.899 0.548*
(0.656 - 2.863) (0.479 - 1.690) (0.297 - 1.011)
Very Unsatisfied If Only Leaders Were Punished 1.564*** 1.606*** 1.057
(1.141 - 2.144) (1.197 - 2.155) (0.801 - 1.394)
Constant 1.837 1.528 1.070
(0.804 - 4.199) (0.708 - 3.296) (0.523 - 2.185)
Observations 1,576 1,576 1,576
Significance Level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Logistic Regression of Familial Exposure to Violence & Support of Death Penalty (Odds Ratios) 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
VARIABLES Government Officials Army Commanders Government Soldiers
Family Members Were Killed in Conflict 1.369** 1.400** 1.006
(1.009 - 1.860) (1.053 - 1.860) (0.768 - 1.318)
Age 0.990** 0.990** 0.995
(0.980 - 1.000) (0.981 - 0.999) (0.987 - 1.004)
Female 2.088*** 1.610*** 2.040***
(1.505 - 2.897) (1.198 - 2.163) (1.564 - 2.661)
Attended School 1.208 0.882 0.667***
(0.877 - 1.663) (0.655 - 1.190) (0.510 - 0.874)
Married 0.961 0.925 1.131
(0.498 - 1.852) (0.505 - 1.694) (0.655 - 1.953)
Have Children 1.367 1.313 1.018
(0.724 - 2.579) (0.736 - 2.345) (0.600 - 1.728)
Previously Voted in Sudanese Election 0.689** 0.693*** 0.757**
(0.515 - 0.921) (0.530 - 0.905) (0.588 - 0.973)
Believes Reconciliation is Possible between Darfuri Tribes 0.538*** 0.650** 0.728**
(0.365 - 0.792) (0.462 - 0.914) (0.544 - 0.974)
Heard of ICC, Does Not Know Much About Roles 1.483** 1.439** 1.276
(1.009 - 2.179) (1.004 - 2.063) (0.916 - 1.778)
Heard of ICC, Knows About Roles 2.087*** 1.303 1.362
(1.227 - 3.549) (0.812 - 2.089) (0.874 - 2.123)
Somewhat Possible to Live Peacefully with Former Enemies 1.128 1.016 0.905
(0.721 - 1.766) (0.685 - 1.507) (0.609 - 1.344)
Somewhat Impossible to Live Peacefully with Former Enemies 1.403 1.664* 1.657*
(0.742 - 2.653) (0.936 - 2.957) (0.979 - 2.806)
Strongly Impossible to Live Peacefully with Former Enemies 1.600*** 2.433*** 2.892***
(1.168 - 2.192) (1.821 - 3.250) (2.217 - 3.773)
Somewhat Satisfied If Only Leaders Were Punished 1.085 0.868 0.327***
(0.588 - 2.004) (0.494 - 1.526) (0.179 - 0.596)
Somewhat Unsatisfied If Only Leaders Were Punished 1.311 1.033 0.637
(0.622 - 2.762) (0.537 - 1.990) (0.339 - 1.196)
Very Unsatisfied If Only Leaders Were Punished 1.656*** 1.680*** 1.090
(1.195 - 2.294) (1.240 - 2.275) (0.819 - 1.450)
Constant 1.723 1.320 0.908
(0.723 - 4.106) (0.590 - 2.952) (0.430 - 1.920)
Observations 1,466 1,466 1,466
Significance Level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note for both Table 1 and 2: For the ordinal variable measuring knowledge of the ICC, “No Knowledge of the 
ICC or Its Functions” is excluded. For the ordinal variable measuring whether respondents believe they can 
peacefully live with their enemies, “Strongly Possible” is excluded. Finally, the category denoting those who 
would be “Very Satisfied” if only the leaders (and not the actual perpetrators) were punished is excluded.  
 
17 
 
Before discussing the potential mechanisms behind these findings, I briefly review the 
control variables. Each of the observations on the control variables is true for the specified 
models in both Table 1 and Table 2. With each one-year increase in age, respondents have 
slightly lower odds of preferring the death penalty for government officials (Model 1) and army 
commanders (Model 2). In all three models across both tables, women have significantly higher 
odds of preferring the death penalty. In addition to gender, knowledge of the ICC and its 
functions also influenced respondents’ attitudes about the death penalty. Specifically, 
respondents who had some understanding of the functions of the ICC had higher odds of 
preferring the death penalty for government officials and army commanders compared to those 
respondents who knew nothing of the ICC’s functions. People who have attended any amount of 
schooling in their lifetime have lower odds of choosing the death penalty for government 
soldiers. While age, gender, and education can influence the relationship between exposure to 
violence and punitive attitudes, no such effects are seen with marital status and children.  
 Turning to respondent’s voting history, those persons who had previously voted in at 
least one Sudanese governmental election had lower odds of preferring the death penalty for all 
actors, regardless of the type of exposure to violence they experienced. Similarly, people who 
believe that reconciliation is possible between the tribes of Darfur also have lower odds of 
preferring the death penalty for all actors in both measures of exposure to violence. For those 
respondents who hold the belief that it is possible to live together peacefully with former 
enemies, those who said that they believed it was “Strongly Impossible” to live peacefully had 
significantly higher odds of preferring the death penalty for all three Sudanese government 
actors. Finally, respondents who noted that they would be “Very Unsatisfied” if the actual 
perpetrators of crime went unpunished but the perpetrators’ bosses received punishment had 1.56 
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to 1.68 times higher odds of preferring the death penalty for both Sudanese government officials 
and army commanders compared against those who said they would be “Very Satisfied” with 
only bosses being punished. This same variable was not significantly associated with supporting 
the death penalty for government soldiers, however. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 This study has analyzed the association between personal and familial exposures to 
violence in Darfur and the punitive attitudes of the adult Darfuri refugees living in camps in 
eastern Chad. Most significantly, it found that refugees who were personally maimed and 
refugees whose family members were killed in the conflict have significantly higher odds of 
preferring the death penalty for actors who organize the violence, including Sudanese 
government officials and Sudanese army commanders. Yet, the individuals who have been 
personally maimed have significantly lower odds of preferring the death penalty for the actual 
perpetrators of the violence—Sudanese soldiers. 
 This finding could offer key insights into the way victimized populations believe 
perpetrators of mass violence will be reintegrated into their societies. In this case, respondents 
may have higher odds of preferring the death penalty for the government officials and army 
commanders because they do not have personal relationships with these actors, whereas the 
government soldiers may have once been members of their communities. In addition, Sudan 
mandates military conscription for all men between the ages of 18 and 30 (Copley 2006), so 
respondents may see soldiers as following orders and thus may not view them as responsible. 
Instead, blame is allocated toward those giving the orders, which include government officials 
and army commanders.  
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 It is also noteworthy that women had significantly higher odds of preferring the death 
penalty for perpetrators than men. This could possibly be explained by gendered experiences of 
violence in Darfur. Generally, men are likely to suffer injuries like the loss of a limb and men are 
more likely to be killed. While men can also be victims of sexual violence, women are much 
more likely to suffer from sexual violence, like rape and genital mutilation, which can be seen as 
a more personal invasion of their bodily autonomy (Kaiser & Hagan 2015). Women are also 
more likely to be detained for longer periods of time by perpetrators, suggesting that the violence 
they experienced may have lasted for longer durations. However, respondents were 
understandably not asked to elaborate on the types of violence they personally experienced due 
to the sensitivity of the subject, so the mechanism behind this effect cannot be further examined. 
 The lower odds of preferring the death penalty associated with schooling and past voting 
history suggest a negative correlation between both punitive attitudes/education and punitive 
attitudes/civic engagement, meaning higher education and civic engagement correlates to lower 
punitive attitudes. It is intuitive that those respondents who believe that reconciliation is possible 
between Darfuri tribes have lower odds of preferring the death penalty since a person with a 
strong belief in reconciliatory potential would not necessarily need to resort to highly punitive 
punishments. The narrative is further supported by those individuals with higher punitive 
attitudes who do not believe they can live peacefully with their former enemies since the death 
penalty would remove any opportunity for respondents to live with their former enemies. 
 As the genocide in Darfur is ongoing and international action has stalled, it is imperative 
to understand specific actions that can be taken to achieve justice for the Darfuri people. It is 
insufficient to base political action solely on the consensus of international and domestic 
leadership, as their opinions may differ from those victimized in the conflict. This research helps 
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to explain Darfuri victims’ punitive attitudes. More broadly, this study elucidates what victims of 
large-scale atrocities believe is the most appropriate outcome for those perpetrators who commit 
heinous crimes. This provides a better understanding for international and domestic lawmakers 
as they work to make informed decisions about reconciling past harms and preventing future 
crimes. 
 
Appendix I 
 
Below is a list of each of the questions used in this study, exactly as they are worded in the 24 
Hours for Darfur survey given to respondents. 
 
Independent Variables: 
1. Have you suffered violence/were you physically maimed in an attack related to the 
current conflict? 
a. Potential answers: Yes, No, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood 
2. How many of your immediate family members (parents, siblings, spouses, children) were 
killed in attacks related to the current conflict? 
a. Open ended numerical response 
 
Dependent Variables: 
1. (Referring to eight actors—including Sudanese government officials, Sudanese army 
commanders, and Sudanese government soldiers—that were listed in a previous 
question): What should their punishment be? 
a. Potential answers: Death, Prison Sentence, Diyya, Other, Uncertain, Refused, Not 
Understood 
 
Control Variables 
1. How old are you? 
a. Open ended numerical response 
2. Sex? 
a. Potential answers: Male, Female 
3. Have you ever attended school or religious school? 
a. Potential answers: Yes, No, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood 
4. What is your marital status? 
a. Potential answers: Married, Single, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood 
5. Do you have children? 
a. Potential answers: Yes, No, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood 
6. Have you ever voted in an election for a political official? 
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7. I am going to read a statement. Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree. “Reconciliation is possible between the tribes of 
Darfur.” 
a. Potential answers: Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, 
Strongly Disagree, Other, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood 
8. Which of the following best represents your knowledge of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC)?  
a. Potential answers: I have not heard of the ICC, I have heard about the ICC but do 
not know very much about what it does, I have heard about the ICC and I 
understand what it does, Other, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood 
9. Some people say that it is possible for former enemies to live peacefully together after a 
war. Some people say that it is not possible for former enemies to live peacefully together 
after a war. Do you believe strongly that it is possible, somewhat that it is possible, 
somewhat that it is impossible, or strongly that it is impossible? 
a. Potential answers: Strongly Possible, Somewhat Possible, Somewhat Impossible, 
Strongly Impossible, Other, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood 
10. If people who personally committed crimes against you or your community were not 
punished in a criminal justice system, but their bosses were. Would you be very satisfied, 
somewhat satisfied, somewhat unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied? 
a. Potential answers: Very Satisfied, Somewhat Satisfied, Somewhat Unsatisfied, 
Very Unsatisfied, Other, Uncertain, Refused, Not Understood 
Other Questions Referenced in Study 
1. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of these statements. 
b. Once there is peace in Darfur, former combatants who killed civilians or who 
raped women should not be accepted in their communities in any case and they 
should be punished.  
c. Once there is peace in Darfur, former combatants who killed civilians or raped 
women should be accepted and what happened should be forgotten. 
d. Once there is peace in Darfur, former combatants who killed civilians or raped 
women could be accepted if they pay diyya. 
e. Once there is peace in Darfur, former combatants who killed civilians or raped 
women could be accepted if they do nothing more than apologize publicly and 
beg for forgiveness.  
i. Potential answers to all questions: Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, 
Somewhat Disagree, Strongly Disagree, Uncertain, Refused, Not 
Understood 
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